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COMPENSATING NUCLEAR DAMAGE IN CHINA 
LIU JING

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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Japanese Fukushima accident of March 2011 triggered numerous 
countries to reconsider their nuclear policies.
1
 Some reconsidered the use 
of nuclear power altogether, while others postponed building new plants.
2
 
The Fukushima incident has also led to a heated discussion on the 
adequacy of the compensation that victims receive after a nuclear 
accident.
3
 China, in particular, given its geographical proximity to Japan, 
is starting to pay close attention to nuclear power issues.
4
 Countries’ 
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 1. See Policy Responses to the Fukushima Accidents, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N (Feb. 24, 2012), 
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/default.aspx?id=29733&terms=Fukushima%20Accident. For the 
discussion of different responses to the Fukushima accident, see Lincoln Davies, Beyond Fukushima: 
Disaster, Nuclear Energy, and Energy Law, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1937, 1947–59 (2011).  
 2. For example, the UK temporarily suspended its new nuclear plant construction program 
shortly after the accident. See THE INST. OF ENERGY ECON., JAPAN IMPACTS ON OVERSEAS NUCLEAR 
POWER DEVELOPMENT POLICIES BY THE SEVERE ACCIDENT AT FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI NUCLEAR POWER 
STATION (2011), available at http://eneken.ieej.or.jp/data/3782.pdf. 
 3. For a detailed analysis of the compensation system for nuclear damage in Japan, as well as of 
the Fukushima incident, see Julius Weitzdörfer, Die Haftung für Nuklearschäden nach japanischem 
Atomrecht—Rechtsprobleme der Reaktorkatastrofe von Fukushima I, Zeitschrift für Japanisches Rech 
[Liability for Nuclear Damages pursuant to Japanese Atomic Law—Legal Problems Arising from the 
Fukushima I Nuclear Accident], 31 JOURNAL OF JAPANESE LAW [J. OF JAPAN. L.] 61 (2011) (Ger.). 
There are also criticisms stating that GE’s vulnerable design of the power plant contributed to the 
accident. See Reiji Yoshida, GE Plan Followed with Inflexibiltiy, THE JAPAN TIMES (July 14, 2011), 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20110714a2.html. Ramseyer even argued that earthquakes are so 
common in Japan that TEPCO basically decided to build its reactor at the site, which is vulnerable to 
earthquake risks, because it would not have to pay the full costs of a meltdown. See J. Mark Ramseyer, 
Why Power Companies Build Nuclear Reactors on Fault Lines: The Case of Japan 18–19 (Harvard 
John M. Olin Centre for Law, Econ. and Bus., Disc. Paper No. 698, 2011), available at http://www 
.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Ramseyer_698.pdf. 
 4. Before the Fukushima accident, China already decided to develop its nuclear power and 
approved its “Medium- and Long-term Nuclear Power Development Plan” (2005–2020) in 2006. See 
China Medium and Long Term Development Planning for Nuclear Power (2005~2020), DYNABOND 
POWERTECH SERV. (Aug. 17, 2009) [hereinafter Nuclear Development Plan], http://www.dynabond 
powertech.com/en/nuclear-power-news/topic-of-the-month/30-topic-of-the-month/2024-medium-and-
long-term-development-planning-for-nu clear-power-20052020 (presenting an English copy of the 
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increasing energy needs and the global desire to fight climate change has 
also led to the existence of a “nuclear renaissance” in China and other 
countries.
5
  
This nuclear renaissance is turning into reality in China. According to 
the “Medium- and Long-term Nuclear Power Development Plan (2005–
2020),” China is planning to increase its nuclear capacity to 40 GWe6 by 
2020.
7
 Nuclear power would then represent four percent of China’s 
electricity demand.
8
 In 2004, nuclear industry produced 7 GWe, 
representing 2.3 percent of China’s electricity generation.9 Thus, the aim is 
to nearly double China’s nuclear capacity in merely sixteen years.10 Given 
this high-speed development of nuclear power, the question arises whether 
the existing nuclear industrial structure and regulatory framework can 
ensure a high level of nuclear safety. A critical component of this 
regulatory framework is the regulation of liability among nuclear power 
plant operators, and how potential victims of nuclear accidents should be 
compensated.
11
 Indeed, an enforceable and efficient nuclear liability 
system may be indispensable to guarantee the protection of the public and 
to contribute to a safer and more environmentally friendly nuclear policy.  
The goal of this article is to address the Chinese compensation 
regulatory regime for nuclear accidents, particularly regarding nuclear 
liability. A full discussion of the Chinese nuclear regulatory framework 
and liability system is beyond the scope of this article. This article 
 
 
plan). Shortly after the accident, China temporarily suspended its approval process for new reactors. 
See WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, supra note 1.  
 5. See Ling Zhong, Nuclear Energy: China’s Approach Towards Addressing Global Warming, 
12 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 493 (2000); see also Zhou, infra note 7. 
 6. GWe means gigawatt electrical, a unit to measure the rate of energy conversion or transfer.  
 7. Yun Zhou, Why is China Going Nuclear?, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 3755, 3755 (2010). See 
generally Nuclear Development Plan, supra note 4. This plan contains five parts: the existing status of 
Chinese nuclear power, the importance to develop nuclear power in China, the guiding principles and 
aim of nuclear development, priorities and implementation as well as supporting measures and 
policies. Id. 
 8. Zhou, supra note 7, at 3755. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See id. 
 11. Expanding nuclear power has led to some concerns such as effectiveness of the regulatory 
system, inadequate nuclear workforce, and lagging public participation, among others. See Yun Zhou 
et al., Is China Ready for Its Nuclear Expansion?, 39 ENERGY POL’Y 771, 778–80 (2011). Though 
there has been no significant nuclear accident in China and no reported serious damage to the public 
yet, the low liability limit has led to concerns in China. See Ximena Vásquez-Maignan, Nuclear 
Liability in China, ASIAN POWER 21 (Feb. 2010), http://www.gide.com/front/files/AsianPower_GLN 
_NuclearLiabilityInChina_feb2010.pdf; Cai Xianfeng, 蔡先凤, 中国核损害责任制度的构建, 中国软科学 2006 
年第9期, 第41页。 [How to Establish and Perfect China’s Civil Liability System for Nuclear Damage], 
189 CHINA SOFT SCIENCE 38, 41 (2006) (China). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss4/2
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primarily focuses on the compensation system for nuclear damage in 
China. Part II of this article provides a short history of China’s nuclear 
policy and its existing nuclear energy regulatory framework. Part III 
discusses the legislative framework for liability and the effectiveness of 
the two critical government documents that regulate nuclear liability in 
China: the “Reply to the Ministry of Nuclear Industry, the National 
Nuclear Safety Bureau and the State Council Atomic Energy Board in 
respect of Handling Nuclear Third Party Liability” published in 1986 (the 
“1986 Reply”), and the “Reply to Questions on the Liabilities of 
Compensation for Damages Resulting from Nuclear Accident” (the “2007 
Reply”).12 Part IV then discusses in more detail the rules dealing with 
nuclear liability in China. Part V provides a critical evaluation and 
comparison of the nuclear liability framework in China, contrasting it to 
some nuclear liability economic starting points and to the nuclear liability 
regime under the U.S. Price-Anderson Act and international conventions. 
Part VI concludes the article.  
II. BACKGROUND 
In 1964, China successfully tested its first atomic bomb and soon after 
began developing nuclear technologies.
13
 Since then, China’s nuclear 
policies and regulatory framework have changed significantly.
14
 This 
section presents a brief introduction of China’s nuclear regulation and 
policies. First, China’s nuclear policies have shifted focus from a military-
oriented policy to civilian uses of nuclear energy (II.A). This shift in 
policy has shaped China’s nuclear energy regulatory framework (II.B). 
The third part presents a brief insight into the nuclear energy industry in 
China (II.C).  
 
 
 12. STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, REPLY TO THE MINISTRY OF 
NUCLEAR INDUSTRY, THE NATIONAL NUCLEAR SAFETY AGENCY AND THE STATE COUNCIL ATOMIC 
ENERGY BOARD IN RESPECT OF HANDLING NUCLEAR THIRD PARTY LIABILITY (国务院关于处理第 
三方核责任问题给核工业部、国家核安全局、国务院核电领导小组的批复) (1986) (China) [hereinafter 1986 
STATE COUNCIL REPLY], available at http://wap.cnki.net/qikan-GWYB198609002.html (last visited 
May 30, 2012). STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, OFFICIAL REPLY OF THE 
STATE COUNCIL TO QUESTIONS ON THE LIABILITIES OF COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGES RESULTING 
FROM NUCLEAR ACCIDENT (国务院关于核事故损害赔偿责任问题的批复) (2007) (China) [hereinafter 2007 
STATE COUNCIL REPLY], translated in ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT (Beijing Office of Envtl. Def. Fund ed., 2007), available at http://www.oecd-
nea.org/law/nlb/nlb-80/documents/103_104_Text China.pdf. 
 13. Zhou et al., supra note 11, at 771. 
 14. For an analysis of the development of nuclear energy policies in China in detail, see id. at 
771–77. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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A. A Short History of China’s Nuclear Energy Policies 
In 1955, China decided to develop its own nuclear industry.
15
 From its 
inception until 1978, the nuclear industry was military-based.
16
 China 
made remarkable progress in the weapons field from 1955 until 1967, 
during which time it successfully tested its first atomic bomb and 
hydrogen bomb and successfully launched its first nuclear missile.
17
 From 
1966 to 1976 the Cultural Revolution disrupted China’s strategic weapons 
program.
18
 Although China’s nuclear policy was primarily military based 
during these first two decades of development,
19
 the research, scientific 
insights, and technological infrastructure that came out of that time served 
as the foundation for China’s nuclear energy industry today.20  
In 1978, Deng Xiaopeng’s converted the Chinese economy from 
centrally planned to a more market driven model.
21
 The economic shift led 
to the change in China’s nuclear policy.22 Chinese nuclear policy changed 
from a “military first” approach to an approach combining military and 
civilian uses.
23
 In the post-1978 period, military industries were converted 
to state owned enterprises in many respects.
24
 As for the nuclear industry, 
the Ministry of Nuclear Industry (“MNI”) was established in 1982 and was 
later reorganized as the China National Nuclear Corporation (“CNNC”) in 
1989.
25
 A first proposal to build a commercial nuclear power plant was 
made in 1981,
26
 to be constructed at Haiyang in the Zhejiang province.
27
 
Later, the State Council decided to build the Qinshan and the Daya Bay 
 
 
 15. STATE COUNCIL, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SAFETY AGENCY, CHINA “NUCLEAR SAFETY 
CONVENTION” NATIONAL REPORT (国务院，中华人民共和国<核安全公约>国家报告) 1 (2001) (China), 
http://nnsa.mep.gov.cn/hannb/200910/t20091029_180456.htm. 
 16. Id.  
 17. See Nuclear Weapons, FED’N OF AM. SCIENTISTS (Nov. 29, 2006), http://www.fas.org/nuke/ 
guide/china/nuke/index.html. 
 18. Zhou et al., supra note 11, at 771.  
 19. During this stage, China mainly focused on developing nuclear weapons program. See Zhou 
et al., supra note 11, at 771–72. This may create a challenge for the transition to a civilian industry. 
For example, military-oriented facilities may not be diverted to civilian use quickly; military facilities 
were located inland and needed to be relocated when civilian facilities started to develop. A shift from 
military to commercial management may create difficulties as well.  
 20. Zhou et al., supra note 11, at 771. 
 21. Nicholas C. Hope et al., Economic Policy Reform in China, in HOW FAR ACROSS THE 
RIVER? CHINESE POLICY REFORM AT THE MILLENNIUM 3 (Nicholas C. Hope et al. eds., 2003).  
 22. Zhou et al., supra note 11, at 771. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Zhou et al., supra note 11, at 772. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss4/2
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nuclear power plants.
28
 In 1991, the Qinshan nuclear power plant began 
operations.
29
 Two years later, the first reactor at the Daya Bay plant came 
into operation.
30
 Despite this progress, the development of nuclear energy 
in China was still relatively low until 2005.
31
 The lack of a long-term 
strategic plan, insufficient financial support, and inconsistencies in 
China’s technological development strategies are all factors that 
contributed to the slow development of China’s nuclear energy industry.32 
China has experienced another shift in its nuclear energy policy since 
2005.
33
 China’s nuclear policy shifted from a period of modest 
development to one of rapid development.
34
 Under the “Medium- and 
Long-term Nuclear Power Development Plan (2005–2020),” the 
government set a goal to reach a nuclear capacity of 40 GWe by 2020.
35
 
This meant that in the years following the publication of the plan in 2005, 
China would have to construct more than two reactors every year, and the 
productive capacity for the whole nuclear fuel cycle needed to increase 
four to six times 2005 levels by 2020.
36
  
This dramatic shift in nuclear energy policy resulted from escalating 
energy demands and environmental pressure.
37
 China’s rapid economic 
development after 1978 led to a fast increase in its total energy 
consumption, and this increased energy demand will only continue.
38
 
 
 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See id. In the energy sector of China, a fragmented regulatory approach and strong vested 
interest (strong state-owned companies in the energy sector) have long been criticized as contributing 
factors to inefficient energy development. For the discussion of institutional inefficiency of the general 
energy sector in China, see Yu Xiaojiang, An Overview of Legislative and Institutional Approaches to 
China’s Energy Development, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 2161, 2164 (2010). There has been no centralized 
government agency making energy policies since 1993. It is even more problematic in the nuclear 
sector where a policy of “limited nuclear development” was adopted in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Therefore, both nuclear energy programs and technology research progressed slowly. See Xu Yichong, 
Nuclear Energy in China: Contested Regimes, 33 ENERGY 1197, 1200–01 (2008). For a discussion of 
the importance of national plans to nuclear development, see Yang Chijen, A Comparison of the 
Nuclear Options for Greenhouse Gas Mitigation in China and in the United States, 39 ENERGY POL’Y 
3025, 3027 (2011), available at http://people.duke.edu/~cy42/US-CN-FR.pdf. 
 33. Zhou et al., supra note 11, at 772–73. 
 34. Id. 
 35. THE COMM’N OF SCI., TECH. AND INDUS. FOR NAT’L DEF., THE 11TH FIVE-YEAR PLAN ON 
NUCLEAR INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT (国防科工委, 核工业“ 十一五” 发展规划) § 2(1) (2006) (China), 
available at http://www.china-nea.cn/files/upload/qhocs5uwkr802g2h74amvf3leodaozuobvw7vkyq0 
nm.doc. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Xu Yichong, supra note 32, at 1219–20. 
 38. See generally Thomas S. Ulen, The Uneasy Case for Competition Law and Regulation as 
Decisive Factors in Development: Some Lessons for China, in COMPETITION POLICY AND 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Accordingly, China needs to develop a nuclear energy policy that strikes a 
balance between the need for greater environmental protection and the 
need to meet increasing energy demands.
39
 Today, China’s energy supply 
still relies largely on coal-fired energy generation, which accounted for 80 
percent of China’s electricity generation in 2007.40 The coal energy in 
China, however, is subject to significant challenges due to transportation 
constraints, increasing coal costs, coal safety issues, and environmental 
costs.
41
 In addition, alternative sources of energy, including natural gas, 
renewable energy, and clean coal technologies, all come with serious 
challenges. These challenges include high costs, lack of storage, and lack 
of technologies.
42
 The special energy mix in China—the existing energy 
structure, energy alternatives, and their potential to meet China’s energy 
needs—makes nuclear energy an attractive alternative to satisfy both 
increasing energy demands and environmental goals such as lowering 
carbon emissions.
43
  
As of September 2011, there are fourteen nuclear power reactors in 
operation in China.
44
 The government approved approximately thirty-four 
new reactors.
45
 Of these thirty-four, twenty-six are actually being built. 
Even though China set its nuclear energy capacity goal at 40 GWe by 
2020 under the “Medium- and Long-term Nuclear Power Development 
Plan (2005–2020),”46 due to the rapid construction, the World Nuclear 
Association estimates that the installed nuclear capacity would exceed 60 
GWe by 2020, reach 200 GWe by 2030, and 400–500 GWe by 2050.47 
The Fukushima Accident triggered nations worldwide to question their 
nuclear policies.
48
 China is no exception.
49
 The State Council announced 
that it would suspend approval of new nuclear power stations until the 
 
 
REGULATION, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA, THE U.S. AND EUROPE 13 (Michael Faure & Zhang 
Xinzhu eds., 2011) (discussing China’s economic growth).  
 39. See generally Antonette D’Sa & K.V. Narasimha Murthy, Environmental Reform in the 
Electricity Sector: China and India, 15 J. ENV. & DEV. 158 (2006) (providing a detailed discussion on 
environmental regulation and management in the electricity sector); Nathaniel T. Aden & Jonathan E. 
Sinton, Environmental Implications of Energy Policy in China, in ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE IN 
CHINA 100 (Neil T. Carter & Arthur P.J. Mol eds., 2007).  
 40. Zhou, supra note 7, at 1256. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Nuclear Power in China, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf 
63.html (last updated Nov. 14, 2012). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Nuclear Development Plan, supra note 4. 
 47. Nuclear Power in China, supra note 44. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss4/2
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adoption of a new Nuclear Safety Plan.
50
 Moreover, it stated that 
comprehensive safety checks would be performed on all operating nuclear 
plants and on those under construction.
51
 The State Council has not yet 
published a Nuclear Safety Plan, but officials in the National Energy 
Agency do not expect that it will make any significant changes to Chinese 
policy regarding the promotion of nuclear energy.
52
 
B. The Shifts in China’s Nuclear Regulatory Framework 
China’s shifting nuclear policy also led to changes in its nuclear 
regulatory framework. Because China’s nuclear regulatory system is 
administered by several authorities and not just a single minister, its 
system is complicated.
53
 For example, in the early 1980s, several 
authorities were involved in nuclear regulation: the National Nuclear 
Safety Administration (“NNSA”), the Minister of Nuclear Industry 
(“MNI”), and the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for 
National Defense (“COSTIND”).54  
Several important reforms of authority in the State Council took place 
since the 1980s. These reforms led to significant changes in the regulatory 
framework of the nuclear power industry.
55
 For example, at the time of its 
establishment in 1984, the NNSA was affiliated with the Science and 
Technology Commission.
56
 As a result of the reform in 1998, the NNSA 
was affiliated with the Minister of Environmental Protection (“MEP”).57 
The MNI was reorganized and renamed the China National Nuclear 
Corporation (“CNNC”) in 1988.58 It became a state-owned enterprise and 
was no longer a state authority. The COSTIND was dismantled in 2008, 
 
 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Chen Qijue, Officials Say that Chinese Nuclear Power May Be Restarted after March Next 
Year (陈其珏, 权威人士称明年3月后我国核电可能步入恢复发展轨道) CN STOCK (Nov. 9, 2011) (China), 
http://www.cnstock.com/index/cj/201111/1658207.htm (last visited May 23, 2012). 
 53. Wang Jin, Current Situation and Issues of China Atomic Energy Law Legislation, THE INT’L 
SYMPOSIA ON NUCLEAR SAFETY, RETHINKING ON THE JAPANESE FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR CRISIS 15–18 
(2011). 
 54. Li Jingjing et al., Recommendations for the Reform of China’s Nuclear Regulatory System 
(李晶晶等,中国核安全监管体制改革建议) CAIXIN (Mar. 12, 2012) (China), http://economy.caixin.com/ 
2012-03-12/100367085_3.html. 
 55. Wang Jin, supra note 53, at 15. 
 56. Historical Development, NAT’L NUCLEAR SAFETY ADMIN. (国家核安全局,历史沿革) (Oct. 28, 
2009) (China), http://nnsa.mep.gov.cn/lsyg/200910/t20091028_180280.htm. 
 57. Id. 
 58. M.V. Ramana & Eri Saikawa, Choosing a Standard Reactor: International Competition and 
Domestic Politics in Chinese Nuclear Policy, 36 ENERGY 6779, 6781 (2011). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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and its authority, except for the administration of nuclear electricity, was 
transferred to the newly established Minister of Industry and Information 
Technology (“MIIT”).59 
The current nuclear regulatory system in China is a combination of 
“unified management and shared responsibilities.”60 The departments 
include the MIIT, the MEP, and the National Development and 
Reformation Commission (“NDRC”).61 Other departments and sectors are 
involved in nuclear and radiation related issues as well.
62
  
The MIIT took control over all of the former functions of the 
COSTIND except for nuclear power management.
63
 Two agencies under 
the MIIT are relevant here: the China Atomic Energy Authority (“CAEA”) 
and the State Administration of Science, Technology and Industry for 
National Defense (“SASTIND”). The CAEA is responsible for planning 
and managing nuclear research, setting policies and regulations for the use 
of nuclear technologies, and supervising nuclear material management and 
control.
64
 It also promotes bilateral and multilateral cooperation with 
international organizations such as the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (“IAEA”).65 The responsibility of SASTIND is to ensure core 
capacity building for the national defense industry.
66
 
The MEP manages the nuclear industry through the NNSA.
67
 The 
NNSA is responsible for regulating nuclear and radiation safety.
68
 It 
makes relevant policies, plans, and standards, and it additionally 
supervises the operation of reactors and material management.
69
 
The National Energy Commission (“NEC”) is another important 
agency in charge of nuclear energy. It was created in 2008 and has the 
authority to establish China’s energy development strategy and oversee its 
energy-related issues.
70
 The daily work of the NEC is conducted by the 
 
 
 59. Li Jingjing, supra note 54; Professors Wang Jin & Tang Yingmao, Peking Univ. Nuclear 
Policy and Law Ctr., The International Workshop on Nuclear Safety: Recent Development of Nuclear 
Legislation in China, in NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, CHINA 7 (2011), available at http://www.nrdc 
.cn/phpcms/userfiles/download/201107/08/5.Recent%20Development%20of%20Nuclear%20Legislati
on%20in%20China%20(Prof.%20Jin%20Wang%20and%20Prof.%20Yingmao%20Tang).pdf. 
 60. Wang Jin & Tang Yingmao, supra note 53, at 16. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Wang Jin & Tang Yingmao, supra note 53, at 16–18. 
 63. Zhou et al., supra note 11, at 773–74. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id.  
 66. Wang Jin & Tang Yingmao, supra note 53, at 17. 
 67. Zhou et al., supra note 11, at 774. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss4/2
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Nuclear Energy Bureau (“NEB”), an agency under the NDRC.71 After the 
organization was restructured in 2008, the NEB took over nuclear power 
authority from the former COSTIND.
72
 
In addition to the three main agencies, other ministers and agencies 
also shared responsibilities. For example, the Ministry of Land and 
Resources is responsible for mineral exploration and mining rights;
73
 the 
Ministry of Health regulates the use of radioactive sources;
74
 and the 
Departments of Public Security, Transportation, Railways, and Civil 
Aviation regulate radioactive material transportation safety.
75
  
C. The Nuclear Industry in China 
In China, only three state-owned enterprises are licensed to own and 
operate nuclear power plants: the CNNC, the China Guangdong Nuclear 
Power Corporation (“CGNPC”), and the China Power Investment 
Corporation (“CPIC”).76 As discussed earlier, the CNNC is reorganized 
from the former Ministry of Nuclear Industry.
77
 Thus, it not only owns 
nuclear plants, but it also controls most nuclear sector business, such as 
R&D, engineering design, nuclear construction companies, and fuel cycle 
facilities.
78
 The CGNPC is another important operator, and it began 
developing its R&D institutes and construction subsidiaries to compete 
with the CNNC.
79
 The CPIC, the third party that can own nuclear power 
plants, is solely an investor and does not have nuclear R&D, 
manufacturing, or construction subsidiaries.
80
 Although these three parties 
are the only parties licensed to own power plants, other parties can invest 
in nuclear projects, such as energy companies, financial institutions, and 
provincial governments.
81
  
Previously, the CNNC owned all of the nuclear manufacturing 
companies in China, but China has started to allow manufacturer 
 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Wang Jin & Tang Yingmao, supra note 53, at 18.  
 74. Id.  
 75. Id.  
 76. See Zhou et al., supra note 11, at 774; see also Ramana & Saikawa, supra note 58, at 6784. 
 77. See Wang Jin & Tang Yingmao, supra note 53. 
 78. Government Structure and Ownership: Nuclear Power in China Appendix 1, WORLD 
NUCLEAR ASS’N, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf63ai_chinanuclearstructure.html (last updated 
Nov. 2012). 
 79. See Zhou et al., supra note 11, at 774; see also Ramana & Saikawa, supra note 58, at 6783.  
 80. Zhou et al., supra note 11, at 774. 
 81. Id. at 776. 
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competition.
82
 China must rely heavily on foreign technologies. For 
example, as of September 2010, eight out of the twelve operating nuclear 
reactors, and nineteen out of the twenty-five reactors under construction 
were based on foreign designs.
83
 China decided to increase its nuclear 
industry self-sufficiency by promoting technology transfer.
84
 The State 
Nuclear Power Technology Company (“SNPTC”), established in 2004, 
oversees the selection of overseas technology and implements these 
technology transfers.
85
  
III. THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK CONCERNING NUCLEAR LIABILITY 
This section will provide a broad sketch of the nuclear liability 
framework in China. It will discuss the sources that have established the 
different norms constituting China’s material rules on nuclear liability. 
The search for the normative framework is complex, as there is no 
integrated nuclear liability act to generally regulate liability issues.
86
 Thus, 
to determine which rules apply to a specific nuclear accident, lawyers 
must consult a variety of sources. We first sketch the broad legislative 
framework (III.A) and then ask a few questions concerning the 
effectiveness of this framework (III.B). The subsequent section will then 
discuss the nuclear liability rules in more detail (IV).  
A. The Legislative Framework 
There are two international regimes concerning nuclear liability that 
were promulgated under the auspices of the IAEA and the Nuclear Energy 
Agency (“NEA”) of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (“OECD”).87 China is not a party to either of these 
conventions. There is also no specific legislative document that stipulates 
exactly how nuclear liability is regulated in China.
88
 The main rules 
 
 
 82. Id. at 774. 
 83. Zhou et al., supra note 11, at 773. 
 84. Benjamin Sovacool & Scott Valentine, The Socio-political Economy of Nuclear Energy in 
China and India, 35 ENERGY 3803, 3810 (2010). 
 85. Government Structure and Ownership, supra note 78. 
 86. See infra Part III.A. 
 87. See Julia Schwartz, International Nuclear Third Party Liability Law: The Response to 
Chernobyl, in INT’L NUCLEAR LAW IN THE POST-CHERNOBYL PERIOD, OECD 37, 42 (2006), available 
at http://www.oecd-nea.org/law/chernobyl/SCHWARTZ.pdf; see also Tom van den Borre, Shifts in 
Governance in Compensation for Nuclear Damage: 20 years after Chernobyl, in SHIFTS IN 
COMPENSATION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE 261, 267 (Michael Faure & Albert Verheij eds., 
2007) (providing a critique).  
 88. Cai Xianfeng, supra note 11, at 39. 
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concerning nuclear liability are found in two reply publications by the 
State Council: the 1986 Reply
89
 and the 2007 Reply.
90
 The effectiveness of 
these two replies and their place in the hierarchical system of legal norms 
in China is addressed below. 
There is no specific act dealing with nuclear liability in China; instead, 
nuclear accidents, unlike in other legal systems, are not explicitly excluded 
from other statutes.
91
 Because these statutes are relatively broad in scope 
and do not explicitly exclude nuclear accidents, they could play a role in 
compensating victims of nuclear accidents in addition to the two State 
Council replies. For example, general tort rules could be applicable. The 
new Tort Liability Law, the General Principles of Civil Law (“GPCL”), 
was introduced in China in December 2009.
92
 Under the GPCL, the 
general provisions concerning civil liability (“Article 106”)93 and 
environmental liability (“Article 124”)94 do not exclude nuclear liability 
from their application.
95
 Those two general provisions can also apply to 
nuclear liability. Article 70 of the 2009 Tort Law provides an explicit legal 
basis for nuclear liability: “If a nuclear accident from a nuclear installation 
leads to third party damage, the nuclear operators shall be liable, unless he 
can prove the damage is caused by war or caused by the victims on 
purpose.”96 
 
 
 89. 1986 STATE COUNCIL REPLY, supra note 12. 
 90. 2007 STATE COUNCIL REPLY, supra note 12. 
 91. For example, the European Directive concerning environmental liability explicitly excludes 
nuclear risks and ecological damage resulting from nuclear activities from the scope of the directive. 
Council Directive 2004/35, art. 4, 2004 O.J. (L 143) 56, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUri 
Serv/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:143:0056:0075:EN:PDF. 
 92. [Tort Liability Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong. Gaz., Jan. 1, 2010, effective July 1, 2010) art. 70 (China) [hereinafter 2009 Tort 
Law]; See generally Michael Faure & Hu Weiqiang, Towards a Reform of Environmental Liability in 
China: an Economic Analysis, 13 ASIA PAC. J. OF ENVTL. LAW 225 (2011) (providing a commentary 
on this tort liability law, especially from the perspective of environmental liability). 
 93. [The General Principles of Civil Law] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., April 12, 
1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987) art. 106 (China) [hereinafter GPCL]. 
 94. GPCL, supra note 93, art. 124. 
 95. Id. art. 106 (“Citizens and legal persons who through their fault encroach upon state or 
collective property or the property or person of other people shall bear civil liability. Civil liability 
shall still be borne even in the absence of fault, if the law so stipulates.”); see also id. art. 124 (“Any 
person who pollutes the environment and causes damage to others in violation of state provisions for 
environmental protection and the prevention of pollution shall bear civil liability in accordance with 
the law.”). 
 Those articles require certain parties to bear civil liability, without further limiting the types of 
activities that lead to the damage. Hence the two articles make no differentiation between nuclear 
damage and damage caused via other reasons. In CPCL, there is no specific provision excluding the 
application to nuclear damage either. 
 96. 2009 Tort Law, supra note 92, art. 70. 
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This is the first time that nuclear liability is explicitly prescribed in a 
statute rather than in merely normative rules issued by the government.
97
 
Even though the 2009 Tort Law does contain one provision addressing 
nuclear liability specifically,
98
 it does not specify the concrete content of 
the liability rule. For instance, the 2009 Tort Law does not address issues 
such as the scope of compensable damage, whether liability is limited, and 
who is a nuclear operator.  
Nuclear damage is not caused by nuclear operators alone. Third parties 
such as suppliers, designers, manufacturers, or constructors contribute to 
the risk as well. The recent Fukushima accident demonstrates the 
contributory risks of third parties. In Fukushima, scientists argued that the 
tsunami led to a full meltdown in several nuclear reactors when it flooded 
the basements housing diesel generators that drove the emergency core 
cooling system.
99
 The meltdown led engineers to question the soundness 
of the basement design by General Electric.
100
  
Consequently, provisions aimed at third parties may be relevant to the 
discussion of nuclear liability. In China, provisions in the Product Quality 
Act (“PQA”) may be relevant.101 Article 73 of the PQA stipulates, “as far 
as nuclear installations and nuclear products are concerned, if the law and 
administrative regulations have different rules, those rules will apply.”102 
Article 73 of the PQA, however, still leaves room for specific nuclear 
liability legislation.
103
 
China also has sector specific environmental laws that could apply to 
nuclear accidents. Since nuclear activities may cause serious 
environmental damage, liability rules under environmental legislations 
may be relevant. The Environmental Protection Act (“EPA”) is the basic 
act in the field of environmental law.
104
 Sector based acts may also play a 
 
 
 97. See infra discussion Part III.B (addressing the hierarchy and effectiveness of different 
normative documents). 
 98. 2009 Tort Law, supra note 92, art. 70. 
 99. Norihiko Shirouzu & Chester Dawson, Design Flaw Fueled Nuclear Disaster, WALL ST. J. 
(June 30, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304887904576395580035481822.html. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Cai Xianfeng, supra note 11, at 42. 
 102. [Product Quality Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Feb. 22, 
1993, effective Sept. 1, 1993) art. 73 (China) [hereinafter Product Quality Law]. 
 103. Id. 
 104. [Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 1989, effective Dec. 26, 1989) (China) [hereinafter 
EPA]. See generally Wang Canfa et al., Pondering over the Incident of Songhua River Pollution from 
the Perspective of Environmental Law, in CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY: 
LEGAL REMEDIES FOR TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION 291 (Michael Faure & Song Ying eds., 2008) 
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role, including the Water Pollution Prevention Act (“WPPA”),105 the 
Marine Environmental Protection Act (“MEPA”),106 and the Solid Waste 
Pollution Prevention Act (“SWPPA”).107 In addition, these statutes may 
help define the scope of compensable damage for nuclear accidents.  
Another relevant act is the Radiation Pollution Prevention Act 
(“RPPA”). According to Article 12 of the Act:  
An entity running transportation of nuclear facilities, an entity 
utilizing nuclear technology or an entity developing and utilizing 
uranium (thorium) mines and associated radioactive mines shall be 
responsible for its own prevention and control of radioactive 
pollution, accept the supervision by the administrative department 
of environmental protection and other relevant departments, and 
bear the liabilities in accordance with the law for the radioactive 
pollution it has caused.
108
 
Article 59 further provides: “Whoever causes any damage to others due to 
radioactive pollution shall bear the civil liabilities in accordance with the 
law.”109 These rules apply to the liability caused by radioactive pollution, 
but they are still suspect and do not provide detailed guidance on the scope 
or contents of liability. 
In 1984, China drafted the Atomic Energy Act (“AEA”), which was 
intended to serve as China’s basic nuclear energy act.110 It was intended to 
incorporate both safety regulations and liability rules.
111
 One competent 
authority usually organized the legislative preparatory work for the 
AEA.
112
 Four drafts of the AEA were published, and they were open to 
 
 
(discussing the practical functioning of the Environmental Protection Act in providing protection to 
victims of environmental pollution in China).  
 105. [Water Pollution Prevention Act] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., May 11, 1984, revised Feb. 28, 2008, effective June 1, 2008) (China) [hereinafter WPPA]. 
 106. [Marine Environmental Protection Act] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Aug. 23, 1882, revised Dec. 25, 1999, effective Apr. 1, 2004) [hereinafter MEPA]. 
 107. [Solid Waste Pollution Prevention Act] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Oct. 30, 1995, revised Dec. 29, 2004, effective Apr. 1, 2005) (China) [hereinafter SWPPA]. 
 108. [Law of the People’s Republic of China on Prevention and Control of Radioactive Pollution] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 28, 2003, effective Oct. 1, 2003) art. 
12 (China) [hereinafter RPPA]. 
 109. Id. art. 59. 
 110. Peng Feng, 彭峰,我国原子能立法之思考,上海大学学报 [A Reflection on the Legislation of China’s 
Atomic Energy], 18 J. OF SHANGHAI UNIV. (SOCIAL SCI. EDITION) 69, 73 (2011) (China). 
 111. Wang Jin & Tang Yingmao, supra note 53, at 4. 
 112. Id. at 2–11. 
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other ministers and companies for consultation.
113
 Despite these efforts, 
the AEA was still not enacted.
114
  
One reason that may explain why China has not yet passed the AEA is 
the often changing and sophisticated nature of China’s regulatory 
framework.
115
 Since 1984, there have been several organizational 
restructurings of the State Council. This restructuring has led to changes in 
the competent authority in charge of the drafting work.
116
 The competent 
authority changed from the State Science and Technology Commission to 
the COSTIND, and then the MIIT.
117
 Since there are several ministers in 
charge of nuclear issues, the need for coordination between them makes 
drafting a basic nuclear law even more difficult.
118
  
In spite of these difficulties, drafting work for the AEA is ongoing. 
Since the Fukushima accident, more attention has been paid to the 
legislative work.
119
 There is still no specific atomic energy act 
implemented in China. Although the 2009 Tort Law provides a legal basis 
for nuclear liability, as the provision is quite abstract, China must still rely 
on the two State Council replies when issues regarding nuclear plant 
operator liability and victim compensation arise.
120
  
B. The Effectiveness and Hierarchical Position of the Two Replies  
The above introduction demonstrates that China lacks a specific law 
addressing nuclear liability. Some general rules about tort law and 
environmental law may be relevant, but the details of liability rules are 
primarily reflected in the two State Council Replies.  
China did not start to build its nuclear power plants until the 1980s.
121
 
It is also not a party to either of the international nuclear liability 
regimes.
122
 Accordingly, foreign suppliers were concerned about the 
 
 
 113. Peng Feng, supra note 110, at 73. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See supra Part II.B. 
 116. Wang Jin & Tang Yingmao, supra note 53, at 15. 
 117. Id. at 3–10. 
 118. See Wang Jin & Tang Yingmao, supra note 53. 
 119. In response to Fukushima accident, the government restarted the draft procedure of AEA. See 
Zhao Wei, 赵威:原子能立法研究,法学杂志 [Research About Legislation for Atomic Energy], 212 LEGAL 
SCI. MAG. 14, 15 (2011) (China). 
 120. See 1986 STATE COUNCIL REPLY, supra note 12; 2007 STATE COUNCIL REPLY, supra note 
12.  
 121. Ximena Vásquez-Maignan, supra note 11, at 20. 
 122. There are two international nuclear liability regimes: the Paris Convention regime and 
Vienna Convention regime. They are established under the OECD/NEA and IAEA auspices. See Paris 
Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, July 29, 1960, 956 U.N.T.S. 251 
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Chinese nuclear liability framework—or lack thereof—during contract 
negotiations for the construction of the Daya Bay power plant in 1985.
123
 
One critical concern was whether the operator or the suppliers would be 
liable for damage suffered by third parties during the construction and 
operation of the plant.
124
 In response to this concern, the Ministry of 
Nuclear Industry, the National Nuclear Safety Bureau, and the State 
Council Atomic Energy Board began research on nuclear liability issues 
and decided to follow the major principles of the Paris Convention and the 
Vienna Convention.
125
 They then requested the State Council to issue 
instructions to follow the major principles of the Paris and Vienna 
Conventions.
126
 In 1986, the State Council published its Reply to the 
organizations’ request.127 The State Council’s 1986 Reply resulted in the 
promotion of contracts and cooperation between the Chinese nuclear 
operators and foreign suppliers over the next several years.
128
  
Over the next two decades, China improved its mastering of 
Generation II power plant technologies, decreasing its dependence on 
foreign suppliers.
129
 In 2007, China planned to introduce Generation III 
technologies from AREVA and Westinghouse.
130
 The concerns of foreign 
suppliers rose again, resulting in the publication of the State Council’s 
2007 Reply.
131
 
The circumstances surrounding the State Council’s two replies explains 
why the Chinese system mimics the two international nuclear liability 
regimes. The process of their issuance also suggests that they are not 
formal administrative regulations published by the State Council, which 
require a more formal and sophisticated promulgation procedure. 
 
 
[hereinafter Paris Convention of 1960]; Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, 
May 21, 1963, 1063 U.N.T.S. 358 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. China is a contracting party to 
neither Convention. See Press Kit: International Nuclear Third Party Liability, OECD/NEA, 
http://www.oecd-nea.org/press/press-kits/nuclear-law.html (last visited May 23, 2012); Vienna 
Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, IAEA, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Docu 
ments/Conventions/liability_status.pdf (last visited May 30, 2012). 
 123. Ximena Vásquez-Maignan, supra note 11, at 20. 
 124. Li Yayun, 李雅云,核损害责任法律制度研究,环球法律评论 [On the Nuclear Damage Liability], 24 
GLOBAL LAW REVIEW 360, 370 (2002) (China). 
 125. Cai Xianfeng, 蔡先凤,核损害民事责任研究, [The Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage] (May 
2004) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Wuhan University, China) (on file with the Wuhan University 
Library), at 291–92, available at http://cdmd.cnki.com.cn/Article/CDMD-10486-2008047666.htm.  
 126. Cai Xianfeng, supra note 125. 
 127. See 1986 STATE COUNCIL REPLY, supra note 12. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Ximena Vásquez-Maignan, supra note 11, at 20. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
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According to the “Law on Legislation,” formal legal sources in China 
include laws, administrative regulations, local decrees, autonomy decrees, 
administrative rules, and local rules.
132
 The law is promulgated by the 
National People’s Congress or the Standing Committee thereof;133 
administrative regulations are enacted by the State Council;
134
 local 
decrees and autonomous decrees are issued by the Peoples’ Congress of 
provinces, autonomous regions, or municipalities directly under the central 
government;
135
 and administrative rules and local rules are issued by 
ministers or local governments.
136
 The two relevant State Council replies 
were enacted by the State Council as general rules on nuclear liability and 
do not qualify as administrative regulations.
137
 An administrative 
regulation requires promulgation under the authorization of the 
constitution and national law, and it must comply with special 
procedures.
138
 The State Council’s replies are normative rules that have the 
nature of quasi-administrative regulations in practice.
139
  
To what extent litigants could directly use the 2007 Reply in a civil 
court or how the courts would deal with the rules promulgated in the 
Reply if it contradicted a law of higher legal hierarchy, however, is 
unclear. The Supreme Court published a judicial explanation entitled “The 
Rules on the Citation of Law, Administrative Regulations and Other 
Normative Documents in the Judgment” in 2009.140 According to the 
Supreme Court’s explanation, a civil judgment should cite laws, legislative 
explanations, or judicial explanations.
141
 Courts can cite the applicable 
administrative regulations and local decrees directly.
142
 Other normative 
documents, if necessary and determined to be effective, can only be used 
 
 
 132. Lifa Fa [Law on Legislation] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., 
Mar. 15, 2000, effective July 1, 2000) 2000 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 112, art. 
2 (China) [hereinafter Law on Legislation]; see also Jan Michiel Otto & Yuwen Li, An Overview of 
Law-making in China, in LAW-MAKING IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1 (Jan Michiel Otto et 
al. eds., 2000) (explaining law making powers in China).  
 133. Law on Legislation, supra note 132, art. 7. 
 134. See Li Shishi, The State Council and Law-Making, in LAW-MAKING IN THE PEOPLE’S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 91 (Jan Michiel Otto et al. eds., 2000) (discussing the law making powers of the 
State Council in China).  
 135. Law on Legislation, supra note 132, art. 63. 
 136. Id. art. 71–73. 
 137. Cai Xianfeng, supra note 11, at 41. 
 138. Li Shishi, supra note 134, at 94–101. 
 139. See supra note 12. 
 140. [The Rules on the Citation of Law, Administrative Regulations and Other Normative 
Documents in the Judgment] (Judicial Explanation) (promulgated by Judicial Committee of Supreme 
Court, July 7, 2009, effective Nov. 4, 2009), art. 4 (China) [hereinafter Judicial Explanation 2009].  
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
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as a source of argument.
143
 In other words, courts cannot use other 
normative documents as the sole source of their judgment.  
Accordingly, the binding force of both State Council replies is unclear. 
The 2007 Reply is intended to be temporary until an AEA is enacted that 
expressly provides for regulations concerning nuclear liability.
144
 As 
previously mentioned,
145
 the legislative framework of the AEA is still 
developing. If the binding force of a State Council reply is unclear, it is 
curious why the Chinese government chose to address the important issue 
of nuclear liability via a State Council reply. One explanation may be 
efficiency; the State Council’s ability to issue a reply quickly makes it 
possible for nuclear industries to sign contracts with the foreign suppliers 
in a timely manner.
146
 Questions regarding the legal effect of State Council 
replies will not be answered until the National People’s Congress enacts 
the AEA and courts begin to enforce it.
147
  
IV. LIABILITY RULES 
Having sketched the general legislative framework and the problem it 
creates in Part III, Part IV will address the contents of the legal rules 
applicable to nuclear accidents, particularly the liability regime, in more 
detail. The 1986 Reply and 2007 Reply provide the general framework 
concerning the nuclear liability regime in China. They are both normative 
documents issued by the State Council. The 1986 Reply has not been 
officially revoked. According to the last in time rule, meaning that a new 
law prevails over the old one, when the two documents have contradictory 
provisions, the 2007 Reply applies.
148
 Certain issues, however, such as the 
 
 
 143. Id. art. 6.  
 144. The end of the Reply states: “The Atomic Energy Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(Draft) shall be drafted to expressly provide for the foregoing matters as well as the limitation of 
actions, jurisdiction, etc.” 2007 STATE COUNCIL REPLY, supra note 12. In the other words, the 2007 
Reply applies before the AEA is enacted. If the AEA has some different stipulations, the AEA will be 
applicable. See id. 
 145. See supra Part III.A. 
 146. Ximena Vásquez-Maignan, supra note 11, at 21. 
 147. For a more in depth discussion regarding the legal status of the State Council Replies, see 
Kevin Li, Development of Maritime Limitation of Liability in China, 42 HONG KONG L. J. 253 (2012). 
 148. A last in time rule also applies in China. See Law on Legislation, supra note 132, art. 83. In 
the case of national law, administrative regulations, local decrees, autonomous decrees and special 
decrees, and administrative or local rules enacted by the same body, if a special provision differs from 
a general provision, the special provision shall prevail; if a new provision differs from an old 
provision, the new provision shall prevail. See id. 
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statute of limitations and the jurisdictional issues, are only addressed in the 
1986 Reply.
149
 For those issues, the 1986 Reply remains applicable.  
As previously stated,
150
 the State Council’s responses to the concerns 
of foreign suppliers contain principles derived from international nuclear 
liability conventions. The replies, however, are just cursory provisions. 
Some issues, such as the scope of compensable damage, need further 
clarification in light of the Chinese tort system. This section highlights 
some important components of the nuclear liability regime under the 
replies, with reference to other related and more general acts. After all, as 
explained above,
151
 nuclear accidents do not fall outside the scope of these 
general tort law rules. The general tort law rules may be applicable in 
cases of nuclear accidents.  
A. Definition of Nuclear Damage 
1. Nuclear Damage under the Replies 
In establishing nuclear liability, it must first be determined what type of 
damage is actionable. According to the 1986 Reply, nuclear operators are 
liable under two circumstances. First, they are liable for nuclear damage 
caused by nuclear accidents on the site of a nuclear power plant.
152
 
Second, they are liable for nuclear damage caused by nuclear accidents 
within the territory of China that occurred during the transportation of 
nuclear substances after the operator had taken charge of the nuclear 
substances and before another party took charge of the nuclear 
substance.
153
 This provision in the 1986 Reply, however, does not clearly 
define what constitutes nuclear damage or a nuclear accident. It does not 
touch upon the gradual damage a nuclear installation can cause. It also 
does not discuss nuclear damage that nuclear substances alone can cause 
without an accident.  
The 2007 Reply, however, did include three express examples of what 
constitutes nuclear damage: “The operators shall be liable to compensate 
 
 
 149. For example, in the 1986 Reply, Article 6 states: “The victim can claim for damages from the 
operator within three years from the day he knows or should have know the damage caused by a 
nuclear accident; however, this claim should be made within ten years after the accident.” 1986 STATE 
COUNCIL REPLY, supra note 12, art. 6. Article 7 states: “For all the liability litigations caused by an 
nuclear accident happening in the territory of China, Chinese law should apply. Those litigations 
should be filed to the court, which has jurisdiction in the place where the accident happens.” Id. art. 7. 
 150. See supra Part III.B. 
 151. See supra Part III.A. 
 152. 1986 STATE COUNCIL REPLY, supra note 12, art. 2. 
 153. Id. 
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for the personal casualties, property losses or environmental damage 
arising out of nuclear accidents . . . .”154 Environmental damage now 
explicitly qualifies for compensation under the 2007 Reply. As previously 
discussed,
155
 however, the Reply itself does not define the three types of 
damage resulting in uncertainties, including whether pure economic losses 
qualify for compensation and what constitutes environmental damage. The 
concrete scope of these concepts can only be understood within the 
broader picture of Chinese tort law and environmental law. 
2. Scope of Liability under Other Related Acts 
As mentioned in Part III.A, in addition to the two State Council replies, 
nuclear liability may be based on general rules under the GPCL, the Tort 
Law, and other environmental acts. 
a. Personal Injury, Property Damage, and Pure Economic Loss 
Article 106 of the GPCL provides that “[c]itizens and legal persons 
who through their fault encroach upon state or collective property or the 
property or person of other people shall bear civil liability. Civil liability 
shall still be borne even in the absence of fault, if the law so stipulates.”156 
Under this provision, the court can establish liability if there is 
encroachment upon property or person.
157
 It does not use the term 
“property right” or “personal right.” Under Article 2 of the 2009 Tort Law, 
the expression is clearer: 
Those who infringe upon civil rights and interests shall be subject to 
the tort liability according to this Law. 
The term “civil rights and interests” used in this act includes the 
right to life, the right to health, the right to name, the right to 
reputation, the right to honor, right to self image, right of privacy, 
marital autonomy, guardianship, ownership, usufruct, security 
interest, copyright, patent right, exclusive right to use a trademark, 
right of discovery, equities, right of succession, and other personal 
and property rights and interests.
158
 
 
 
 154. 2007 STATE COUNCIL REPLY, supra note 12, art. 2. 
 155. See supra Part III.A. 
 156. GPCL, supra note 93, art. 106. 
 157. Id. 
 158. 2009 Tort Law, supra note 92, art. 2. 
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The provisions under Article 2 use “civil rights and interests” instead 
of simply “civil rights.” The provision further defines the term “civil rights 
and interest” by listing specific rights and interests.159 The catchall 
expression also enables an interest to receive protection under the Tort 
Law even if it is not established as a “civil right” and not explicitly 
included in the list.
160
 An example would be pure economic loss.
161
 As a 
result of this provision, there are, in theory, no specific legislative hurdles 
for establishing liability for pure economic loss even though neither the 
GPCL nor the Tort Law contain explicit provisions regarding pure 
economic losses. Acts or judicial explanations that explicitly permit 
compensation for pure economic loss only exist in specific limited 
fields.
162
 In practice, therefore, pure economic losses are compensated in 
only a limited number of cases. These cases include claims for living 
expenses for individuals dependent on the deceased, misrepresentation 
under the Securities Act, third parties infringing creditor’s rights,163 and 
marine oil pollution.
164
  
Under Article 65 of Chapter VIII of the Tort Law, parties responsible 
for environmental damage will be held strictly liable, meaning that 
polluters will be held liable for the harm caused by their pollution 
irrespective of fault or wrongfulness.
165
 Chapter IX of the Tort Law deals 
specifically with ultra hazardous activities.
166
 Article 70 of Chapter IX 
explicitly stipulates strict liability for the operator of civil nuclear facilities 
except for specific situations.
167
 Although Chapter VIII and Chapter IX of 
 
 
 159. Id.  
 160. The language, “and other personal and property rights and interests” in Article 2 implies that 
the list of rights and interests is not exclusive. Hence, in addition to the listed civil rights and interests, 
if there is infringement on other rights and interests, tort liability may also be established. See Vernon 
V. Palmer, The Great Spill in the Gulf . . . and a Sea of Pure Economic Loss: Reflections on the 
Boundaries of Civil Liability, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 105, 115 n.45 (2011). 
 161. See id. 
 162. For example, there are provisions about compensation for the living expenses of the victim’s 
dependents and mis-presentations in the field of security market or by professionals. Zhang Xinbao & 
Li Qian, 张新宝,李倩,纯粹经济损失赔偿规则:理论、实践及立法选择。张新宝,李倩 [The Compensation Rule of 
Pure Economic Loss: Theory, Practice and Legislative Choice], 121 LEGAL FORUM [LEGAL F.] 5, 7–
10 (2009) (China). 
 163. Id. at 7–10. 
 164. See Ma Jingjing & Du Jiang, Discussion on the National Claim System for Oil Pollution 
Damage from Ships, in PREVENTION AND COMPENSATION OF MARINE POLLUTION DAMAGE: RECENT 
DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPE, CHINA AND THE U.S. 223, 234–36 (Michael Faure & James Hu eds., 
2006) (discussing compensation for pure economic losses in the field of marine oil pollution). 
 165. 2009 Tort Law, supra note 92, art. 65 (“Where any harm is caused by environmental 
pollution, the polluter shall assume the tort liability.”). 
 166. Id. arts. 69–77. 
 167. Id. art. 70 (“Where a nuclear accident occurs to a civil nuclear facility and causes any harm to 
another person, the operator of the civil nuclear shall assume the tort liability unless it can prove that 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss4/2
  
 
 
 
 
2012] COMPENSATING NUCLEAR DAMAGE IN CHINA 801 
 
 
 
 
the Tort Law may cover nuclear accidents, neither of them specifies the 
scope of damage for which polluters and operators can be held liable.  
b. Environmental Damage 
Environmental damage is another term that needs explanation. Since 
neither the GPCL, the ELP, nor the new Tort Law defines “environmental 
damage,”168 it is unclear whether environmental damage covers only 
personal injury and property damage, or whether it also covers damage 
done to the environment itself. It is also unclear whether the enjoyment of 
the environment, costs of preventive measures, and restoration measures 
are compensable. Some specific environmental acts do contain provisions 
that indirectly permit remedies for pure environmental damage. For 
example, under the MEPA, “[f]or damages to marine ecosystems, marine 
fishery resources and marine protected areas which cause heavy losses to 
the State, the department invested with power by the provisions of this law 
to conduct marine environment supervision and administration shall, on 
behalf of the State, claim for the damage.”169 
Under this provision, the competent public authorities can file claims 
for pure environmental damage.
170
 Another example is the SWPPA, which 
requires parties who pollute through solid waste to eliminate the risk, 
compensate for the losses, and take measures to restore the 
environment.
171
 The liable party has an obligation to take restorative 
measures or to pay the costs.
172
 Thus, if a nuclear accident pollutes the 
marine environment or radiation waste results in pollution, these 
provisions may be applied.  
In practice, however, compensation for pure environmental damage is 
still limited.
173
 Marine pollution has received more compensation than 
other types of pure environmental damage, but most of the cases involve 
 
 
the harm is caused by a situation such as war or by the victim intentionally.”). 
 168. Even though, as was just mentioned, the new Tort Law explicitly introduces strict liability for 
environmental harm. See 2009 Tort Law, supra note 92. 
 169. [Marine Environmental Protection Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Dec. 25, 1999, effective Apr. 1, 2000) (China). 
 170. Id. 
 171. SWPPA, supra note 107, art. 85 (“When solid waste leads to environmental pollution, the 
liable party should eliminate hazards, compensate for damage and restore the environment.”).  
 172. Id. 
 173. ZHU XIAO, A STUDY OF SOCIALIZED INDEMNIFICATION FOR ECOLOGICAL DAMAGE: A 
JURISPRUDENTIAL PERSPECTIVE (竺效,生态损害的社会化填补法理研究,中国政法大学出版社) 28 (2007) 
(China). 
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oil pollution.
174
 For nuclear accidents, compensation may be directed more 
toward personal injury and property damage than pure environmental 
damage. Based on the text of the MEPA, it is still relatively unclear 
whether and to what extent pure environmental damage would be 
compensated. The new Tort Law seems to provide an important legal 
basis, but the text is still novel, and it is unclear how it would be applied in 
cases of environmental harm by way of a nuclear accident.  
B. Strict Liability  
Strict liability is also adopted under China’s nuclear damage liability 
regime. The 1986 Reply prescribes that the operators bear “absolute 
 
 
 174. China is a party to the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 
(the “CLC”), which allows compensation for preventive and reinstatement measures. Protocol of 1992 
to amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969, Nov. 27, 
1992, 973 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter the CLC]. Under the influence of the CLC, China promulgated 
various regulations and judicial explanations that explicitly allow compensation for some parts of 
environmental damage. For example, Article 3 of the Provision of the Supreme People’s Court on 
Several Issues Concerning the Trial of Cases of Disputes over Compensation for Vessel-induced Oil 
Pollution Damage allows compensation for preventive measures, loss of revenue due to environmental 
damage, and reinstatement measures. [Provision of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues 
Concerning the Trial of Cases of Disputes over Compensation for Vessel-induced Oil Pollution 
Damage] (promulgated by Judicial Comm. Sup. People’s Ct., Jan. 10, 2011, effective July 1, 2011) 
(China), available at http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=8822&CGid=. Similar 
provisions can also be found in the Maritime Procedure Act (Article 21) and in the Regulation on the 
Prevention and Control of Vessel-induced Pollution to the Marine Environment (Article 42). Article 
21 of the Maritime Procedure Act states: 
The following maritime claims may applied for arresting ships: . . . (4) the damage or threat 
of damage caused by the ship to the environment, seashore or the relevant interested parties; 
the measures taken for prevention, reduction and elimination of such damage; payment for 
compensation of such damage; the reasonable cost for the measures taken actually or 
preparing to take for restoring the environment; loses the third party suffered or will probably 
suffer due to such damage; and the damage, fees or loses which are similar in nature specified 
in this Item. 
[Maritime Procedure Act] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 25, 1999, 
effective July 1, 2000) (China). Article 42 of the Regulation on the Prevention and Control of Vessel-
induced Pollution to the Marine Environment states: 
Where a vessel-induced pollution incident occurs, the Maritime Administration may take 
necessary measures, including removal, salvage, towage, pilotage and lighterage, to mitigate 
the pollution damage. The relevant expenses arising from such measures shall be borne by the 
ship and/or the unit that is responsible for the pollution to the marine environment. 
[Regulation on the Prevention and Control of Vessel-induced Pollution to the Marine Environment] 
(promulgated by St. Council, Sept. 2, 2009, effective Mar. 1, 2010) (China). However, China issued 
those provisions mainly under the influence of international conventions on oil pollution. See Song 
Ying, China and International Protection of Marine Environment, in MARITIME POLLUTION 
LIABILITY AND POLICY: CHINA, EUROPE AND THE U.S. 333 (Michael Faure et al. eds., 2010). It is less 
clear to what extent pure environmental damage can be compensated.  
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liability” for nuclear damage.175 Although the term “strict” or “absolute” 
liability is not used in the 2007 Reply, it does not require fault to establish 
liability for operators.
176
 Article 70 of the new Tort Law also follows a 
strict liability standard.
177
 It holds liable the operator of the facility causing 
the nuclear accident unless the operator can prove that such harm was 
caused by war or inflicted intentionally by the victim.
178
  
Liability established under the State Council replies and the 2009 Tort 
Law is quite strict. The only available defense is that armed conflict, 
hostile action, war, or riot caused the nuclear accident, and consequently, 
damage.
179
 The 2009 Tort Law added the additional defense for harm 
inflicted intentionally by the victim.
180
 The 1986 Reply also allows “a 
grave natural disaster of an exceptional nature” to serve as a defense,181 
but the 2007 Reply does not.
182
 This change is in line with those made to 
the international nuclear liability regimes; under the first generation of 
international nuclear liability conventions, nuclear damage caused by a 
grave natural disaster was a permissible defense if the domestic legislation 
of the Member States permitted it. Under the second generation of 
international conventions, however, this defense was abrogated.
183
 A 
 
 
 175. 1986 STATE COUNCIL REPLY, supra note 12, art. 2 (“For the nuclear damage caused by an 
accident happened in a nuclear power plants in the territory of China, or before the nuclear material is 
taken charged by other persons and after taking charge of nuclear material from others, the operators 
of the nuclear power plant shall assume absolute liability; no other party will be liable.”). 
 176. 2007 STATE COUNCIL REPLY, supra note 12, art. 2 (“The operators shall be liable to 
compensate for the personal casualties, property losses or environmental damages arising out of 
nuclear accidents, while no persons other than the operators shall be liable to compensate therefore.”). 
 177. 2009 Tort Law, supra note 92, art. 70. 
 178. Id. See also supra Part IV.A.2.a. 
 179. 1986 STATE COUNCIL REPLY, supra note 12, art. 5 (“Operators are not liable when a nuclear 
accident is caused directly by armed conflict, hostile action, riot or natural disaster of an exceptional 
character.”); 2007 STATE COUNCIL REPLY, supra note 12, art. 6 (“With regard to the damages caused 
by a nuclear accident directly resulting from armed conflict, hostile action, war or riot, the relevant 
operator shall not be liable to compensate for such damages.”).  
 180. 2009 Tort Law, supra note 92, art. 70. 
 181. 1986 STATE COUNCIL REPLY, supra note 12, art. 5. 
 182. 2007 STATE COUNCIL REPLY, supra note 12, art. 6. 
 183. For example, when the Paris Convention was passed in 1960, natural disaster may compose a 
valid defense. See Paris Convention of 1960, supra note 122. Article 9 states:  
The operator shall not be liable for damage caused by a nuclear incident directly due to an act 
of armed conflict, hostilities, civil war, insurrection or, except in so far as the legislation of 
the Contracting Party in whose territory his nuclear installation is situated may provide to the 
contrary, a grave natural disaster of an exceptional character.  
Id. art. 9.  
 After the convention was revised in 2004, natural disaster is no longer a valid defense. Article 9 
now states: “The operator shall not be liable for nuclear damage caused by a nuclear incident directly 
due to an act of armed conflict, hostilities, civil war, or insurrection.” Paris Convention, supra note 
122, art. 9 (amended by the 2004 Protocol to Amend the Paris Convention) [hereinafter Paris 
Convention of 2004]. 
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possible positive consequence of this change is that the operators now 
have more incentive to construct and operate nuclear installations more 
carefully in order to make them more resistant to natural disasters. But the 
question of how the operators can afford to pay liability costs for damage 
caused by natural disaster may arise since liability insurance does not 
often cover this type of damage. 
C. Liable Parties 
Both State Council replies adopt the principle of channeling liability; 
only nuclear operators are liable while all other parties are exonerated 
from liability.
184
 The 1986 Reply does not contain a right to recourse 
provision, but the 2007 Reply allows recourse under certain conditions.
185
 
If a written contract between an operator and another person provides for 
the right of recourse, the operator may exercise that right against the other 
person after compensating the victim.
186
 The operator may also have the 
right of recourse if the damage is caused by a third party’s willful act or 
omission.
187
  
Channeling of liability is in contradiction to the general principles of 
tort law, and especially with the Product Quality Act (“PQA”). According 
to the PQA, the producer of the defective product must be held liable for 
personal injury and other property damage caused by the defect.
188
 The 
seller shall be liable for the personal injury and other property damage if 
he is at fault.
189
 If courts apply these provisions to nuclear damage cases, 
the nuclear suppliers may also be held liable if they contributed to the 
damage. Although the PQA leaves room for specific legislation, the 
derogations should be laid down in laws and administrative regulations.
190
 
Since the State Council replies are only normative rules, the method by 
which courts would resolve these conflicts remains unclear.
191
  
The 2009 Tort Law imposes liability on nuclear operators as well. 
Article 70 of Chapter IX prescribes nuclear liability for ultra hazardous 
 
 
 184. Channeling in the nuclear law means that “all liability is channeled to the nuclear operator; 
no other entity may be held liable for nuclear damage.” See Schwartz, supra note 87 and 
accompanying text. 
 185. 2007 STATE COUNCIL REPLY, supra note 12, art. 9. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Product Quality Law, supra note 102, arts. 41–42. 
 189. Id. 
 190. The PQA states that “where laws or administrative regulations provide otherwise on liability 
for damages caused by nuclear facilities and nuclear products, those rules shall apply.” Id. art. 73.  
 191. See supra Part III.B. 
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liability.
192
 Both the general provisions of Chapter IX and the specific 
provision on nuclear liability in Article 70 may apply. The general 
provisions of Chapter IX prescribe that the parties undertaking ultra 
hazardous activities shall be held liable for damage that they caused.
193
 
Article 70 requires nuclear operators to be liable for nuclear damage, but it 
does not explain the term “nuclear operators.”194 Moreover, the Tort Law 
does not exclude the liability of other parties. 
The 2007 Reply defines nuclear operators as: 
The organizations within the territory of the People’s Republic of 
China which have obtained legal personality according to law, and 
operate nuclear power stations, civil research reactors and/or civil 
engineering test reactors, or engaged in the production and 
transportation of civil nuclear fuels and the storage, transportation 
and post-treatment of spent fuels and have nuclear installations.
195
  
This definition suggests that the 2007 Reply applies not only to nuclear 
power plants, but to other civil nuclear installations as well.  
As mentioned above, only three parties are licensed to own and operate 
nuclear power plants in China: CNNC, CGNPC and CPIC.
196
 The 2007 
Reply contains provisions that further clarify which nuclear operators 
might be held liable.
197
 Nuclear installations owned by the same operator 
at the same site are treated as one nuclear installation.
198
 If a nuclear 
accident involves more than two operators and their respective liability 
cannot be clearly determined, the operators are held jointly and severally 
liable.
199
 
D. Limitations on Liability: Magnitude, Time, and Jurisdiction 
The liability of nuclear operators is limited in terms of magnitude, 
time, and jurisdiction. Under the 1986 Reply, the operators’ liability is 
capped at RMB 18 million (5.21 million U.S. dollars in 1986).
200
 The 1986 
Reply does not differentiate between the operator types. The 2007 Reply 
capped liability based on the activities of the operator; the operators of 
 
 
 192. 2009 Tort Law, supra note 92, art. 70. 
 193. Id. art. 69. 
 194. Id. 
 195. 2007 STATE COUNCIL REPLY, supra note 12, art. 1. 
 196. See supra Part II.C. 
 197. See 2007 STATE COUNCIL REPLY, supra note 12, arts. 1–2. 
 198. 2007 STATE COUNCIL REPLY, supra note 12, art. 4.  
 199. Id. art. 5.  
 200. 1986 STATE COUNCIL REPLY, supra note 12, art. 3.  
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nuclear power plants and the operators of spent fuel storage, 
transportation, and post-treatment are liable up to RMB 300 million (47.13 
million U.S. dollars in 2011); other operators are only liable up to RMB 
100 million (15.71 million U.S. dollar in 2011).
201
 Although the award cap 
was increased by the 2007 Reply, the cap is still low in comparison to 
liability caps imposed in the U.S. and the second generation of 
international nuclear liability conventions.
202
 
Under the 2009 Tort Law, neither the general chapters (Chapters I–IV) 
nor the specific chapter on environmental liability (Chapter VIII) provide 
a provision concerning a cap on liability. Caps are allowed in Chapter IX 
for liability for ultra hazardous activities.
203
 According to Article 77 of 
Chapter IX, if other acts allow for a cap on liability for ultra-hazardous 
activities, those acts shall apply.
204
 Unfortunately, it is unclear whether the 
two State Council replies qualify as other acts since they are still only 
normative rules.
205
  
In addition to monetary caps, the 1986 Reply also limits the operators’ 
liability in terms of time and jurisdiction. Because the 2007 Reply does not 
contain a provision on the prescription period, the related provisions in the 
1986 Reply are still applicable. According to the 1986 Reply, victims 
should bring their claims within three years from the day they knew or 
should have known about the nuclear accident damage or within ten years 
after the occurrence of the accident.
206
 This prescription period is quite 
short in the context of nuclear damage since certain types of damage, 
especially personal injury, may not manifest themselves for decades.  
Finally, a nuclear operator’s liability is limited by jurisdictional 
requirements. For a nuclear accident occurring within the territory of 
China, only the court located where the nuclear accident occurred has 
jurisdiction over the claims.
207
 The 2007 Reply provides that:  
Where a nuclear accident causes damage across the border of the 
People’s Republic of China, such damage shall be handled in 
 
 
 201. 2007 STATE COUNCIL REPLY, supra note 12, art. 7.  
 202. For example, in the U.S., nuclear operators for power plants are asked to provide primary 
financial protection up to $375 million. Amounts of Financial Protections for Certain Reactors, 10 
C.F.R. § 140.11(4) (1960). The original Paris Convention requires operators to provide financial 
coverage up to 15 million SDRs (subject to changes by Contracting Parties). Paris Convention of 1960, 
supra note 122, art. 7. This requirement is increased to 700 million Euro. Paris Convention of 2004, 
supra note 183, art. 7. 
 203. 2009 Tort Law, supra note 92, ch. IX. 
 204. Id. art. 77. 
 205. See supra Part III.B. 
 206. 1986 STATE COUNCIL REPLY, supra note 12, art. 6. 
 207. Id. art. 7.  
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accordance with the treaty or protocol between the People’s 
Republic of China and the relevant country. If there is no such 
treaty or protocol, such damage shall be handled according to the 
principle of reciprocity.
208
 
This provision provides a singular approach to addressing the issue of 
trans-boundary damage. It is unclear what the effects of the principle of 
reciprocity would be when foreign law establishes a different regime than 
China.  
E. Financial Security  
Nuclear damage is a high magnitude, low frequency risk. Even though 
liability is capped, financial instruments are necessary to guarantee that 
operators have the capacity to meet their liability requirements in case 
damage does occur.
209
 The 1986 Reply has no specific requirements about 
financial security. With the fast development of China’s nuclear industry 
and the increased liability cap, the necessity of financial security has 
started to receive more attention.
210
 Under the 2007 Reply, operators are 
required to make appropriate financial arrangements to ensure timely and 
effective compensation in case of damage.
211
 Before an operator begins 
nuclear power plant operations or the storage, transportation, or post-
treatment of spent fuel operations, the operator must purchase sufficient 
insurance to cover its limits of liability.
212
 The 2007 Reply does not clarify 
what kind of financial security mechanisms operators can use. In practice, 
operators of nuclear power plants typically choose to realize their financial 
responsibility by seeking liability insurance coverage.
213
  
 
 
 208. 2007 STATE COUNCIL REPLY, supra note 12, art. 3.  
 209. For a general discussion about the necessity of financial instruments to compensate for 
environmental damage, see Alberto Monti, Environmental Risk: a Comparative Law and Economics 
Approach to Liability and Insurance, 9 E.R.P.L. 51, 65–67 (2001); Bidénam Kambia-Chopin, 
Environmental Risks, the Judgment-Proof Problem and Financial Responsibility, 30 EUR. J. L. ECON. 
77, 84 (2010). For the discussion of the necessity to introduce financial security for nuclear liability, 
see Zhou Zhiming & Liu Chunsheng, Present Status and Prospects of the Compensation System for 
Nuclear Damage in China, in NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS: LIABILITY AND GUARANTEES (OECD/NEA) 281 
(1992). 
 210. There is discussion among scholars concerning the importance of financial security. See, e.g., 
Cai Xianfeng, supra note 11; Li Yayun, supra note 124; He Liu, 贺柳,我国核第三者责任保险制度刍议, 
保险研究 [Nuclear Liability Insurance in China], 383 INSURANCE STUDIES, 92 (2011) (China). 
 211. 2007 STATE COUNCIL REPLY, supra note 12, art. 8. 
 212. Id.  
 213. Jia Ying, 贾颖,浅谈我国核责任保险,中国保险, [Nuclear Liability Insurance in China], 281 CHINA 
INSURANCE [CHINA INS.] 47, 48 (2011) (China). 
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In addition to the cap on liability, the two State Council replies require 
the government to provide indemnity. For example, under the 1986 Reply, 
if the nuclear damage exceeds the cap of liability (RMB 18 million), the 
government shall provide necessary indemnity up to RMB 300 million 
(86.89 million U.S. dollars in 1986).
214
 Under the 2007 Reply, the 
government indemnity was increased to RMB 800 million (125.68 million 
U.S. dollars in 2011).
215
 The 2007 Reply allows additional financial 
indemnity if the damage results from an extraordinary nuclear accident 
and the increase is approved by the State Council.
216
 
F. Nuclear Insurance 
In China the operators of nuclear power plants are required to purchase 
insurance to cover their potential liability.
217
 In the early developmental 
stages of China’s nuclear program, only the People’s Insurance Company 
of China (“PICC”) provided liability insurance.218 The capacity of this one 
insurer, however, was very limited.
219
 Similar to other jurisdictions,
220
 the 
insurers decided to pool together to provide insurance coverage for nuclear 
liability. In 1999, four large insurers in China joined forces to provide 
nuclear insurance through a pool—the China Nuclear Insurance Pool 
(“CNIP”).221 In 2011, CNIP had twenty-three members.222  
The CNIP provides three types of nuclear insurance products: nuclear 
material insurance, nuclear liability insurance, and liability insurance for 
the transportation of nuclear substances.
223
 Nuclear material insurance 
covers property and machine damage caused by natural disasters, radiation 
 
 
 214. 1986 STATE COUNCIL REPLY, supra note 12, art. 3. 
 215. 2007 STATE COUNCIL REPLY, supra note 12, art. 7. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. art. 8. 
 218. Zheng Hongliang, 郑宏亮,关于发展我国核保险市场的若干探讨,上海保险 [On the Development of 
China's Nuclear Insurance Market], 2 SHANGHAI INSURANCE [SHANGHAI INS.] 15, 15 (2002). 
 219. Id. 
 220. For example, in the U.S., nuclear liability insurance is provided by a pool: American Nuclear 
Insurers (ANI). For detailed information about the ANI, see Michael Faure & Tom vanden Borre, infra 
note 242, at 248–54. Assuratome in France, the British Nuclear Insurers in the UK, and Syban in 
Belgium are also such examples. See Michael Faure & Karine Fiore, The Civil Liability of European 
Nuclear Operators: Which Coverage for the New 2004 Protocols? Evidence from France, 8 INT’L 
ENVTL. AGREEMENTS: POLITICS, LAW AND ECON. 227, 236 (2008). 
 221. Zheng Hongliang, supra note 218, at 15. 
 222. Members of China Nuclear Pool Has Increased to 23 (中国核工体成员公司增至23家) (Nov. 8, 
2011) (China), available at http://www.cpcr.com.cn/zbxxx/201111/t20111112_23593.shtml. 
 223. China Nuclear Insurance Pool Insurance Policies (核共体保险业务范围) (Jan. 16, 2009), 
available at http://www.chinare.com.cn/zghgt/hbyw/201212/t20121203_26042.shtml. 
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and other nuclear risks, and nuclear accidents.
224
 The coverage is typically 
between 1 and 1.6 billion dollars.
225
 Nuclear liability insurance covers the 
operator’s nuclear liability based on the applicable law.226 The insured 
amount is the required liability for nuclear operators, approximately $45 
million for nuclear power plants.
227
 Both nuclear material insurance and 
nuclear liability insurance policies exclude the damage caused by war, 
insurrection, grave natural disasters, and terrorism.
228
 Under the 2007 
Reply, damage caused by natural disaster and terrorism is not a valid 
defense.
229
 Explained literally, the government is only indemnified if the 
damage exceeds the cap of the operator’s liability. Therefore, the operator 
needs to compensate for the damage caused by a grave natural disaster or 
terrorist act up to his liability limit.  
Before providing insurance coverage to nuclear operators for the first 
time, the CNIP will examine the risk that nuclear installations impose.
230
 
After that, the CNIP will examine the nuclear facility periodically, usually 
every three to five years.
231
 In addition to nuclear material insurance and 
nuclear liability insurance, CNIP provides liability insurance for the 
transportation of nuclear substances.
232
 The insurance clause is determined 
by the type and quantity of substances and the distance, routes, and 
countries or districts that the transporters travel through.
233
  
V. CRITICAL EVALUATION AND COMPARISON 
Comparing the features of China’s nuclear liability regime with the 
international regime and the U.S. Price-Anderson Act lends itself to 
interesting observations. It is somewhat difficult to compare China to 
those other regimes because there is still a large degree of uncertainty 
surrounding the precise scope of nuclear liability in China. For example, 
Article 70 of the Tort Liability Act of 2009 explicitly provides for a strict 
liability standard for nuclear accidents but does not provide any details on 
the precise meaning and implementation of this nuclear liability.
234
 In that 
 
 
 224. Id.  
 225. Id. 
 226. Id.  
 227. Id. 
 228. China Nuclear Insurance Pool Insurance Policies, supra note 223. 
 229. 2007 STATE COUNCIL REPLY, supra note 12, art. 6. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. 
 233. See supra note 223.  
 234. 2009 Tort Law, supra note 92, art. 70. 
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respect, one must refer to the two State Council replies whose legal 
statuses are dubious.
235
 China’s non-cohesive nuclear liability regime 
structure hinders all relevant parties from knowing with certainty what 
remedies—if any—are available to victims in China as compared to the 
international regime or the U.S. Price-Anderson Act.
236
 The replies of the 
State Council do, however, provide enough detail to understand the scope 
of the Chinese nuclear liability regime with more certainty. 
The international treaty system can be divided into two regimes. The 
first regulates civil liability for damage caused by nuclear accidents.
237
 It 
was established under the auspices of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development’s Nuclear Energy Association 
(“OECD”/“NEA”) and consists of the Convention on Third Party Liability 
in the Field of Nuclear Energy of 29 July 1960 (the “Paris Convention”) 
and the Brussels Supplementary Convention to the Paris Convention on 
Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy of 31 January 1963 
(the “Brussels Supplementary Convention”).238 The second nuclear 
liability treaty regime was developed under the auspices of the IAEA: the 
Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage of 21 May 
1963.
239
 The legal literature commented on these international regimes in 
detail, and the regimes have also been the subject of mounting criticism.
240
  
The U.S. did not join the international conventions, but adopted its own 
regulatory system, the Price-Anderson Act of 1957.
241
 There are a few 
remarkable differences not only between China and the international 
regime, but also between the international regime and the U.S. Price-
Anderson Act.
242
 There is one issue, however, on which the three regimes 
do align. Under the Chinese regime and the international regime, a strict 
liability rule applies.
243
 In the U.S., when a nuclear accident qualifies as an 
Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrence (“ENO”), thereby triggering the 
 
 
 235. See supra Part IV.D. 
 236. See supra Part III.B (discussing the various legal norms and different hierarchical orders of 
these various legal norms). 
 237. See supra note 107.  
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. 
 240. See van den Borre, supra note 87, 294–99. 
 241. Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1957). 
 242. See Michael G. Faure & Tom van den Borre, Compensating Nuclear Damage: A 
Comparative Economic Analysis of the U.S. and International Liability Schemes, 33 WM. & MARY 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 219 (2008) (discussing the differences between the U.S. and international 
liability schemes for compensating nuclear damage). 
 243. For Chinese regime, see supra Part IV.B. For a discussion of the international regime, see 
Tom Vanden Borre, Nuclear Liability: An Anachronism in EU Energy Policy?, in EUROPEAN ENERGY 
LAW REPORT VII 184–86 (Martha Roggenkamp & Ulf Hammer eds., 2010). 
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application of the federal Price-Anderson Act, a strict liability standard 
applies.
244
 But for nuclear accidents that do not qualify as an ENO, state 
law applies.
245
 Some states require negligence or fault to trigger 
liability.
246
 
Of greater importance is the question of who can be held liable under 
these regimes. Under the international regime, exclusive civil liability 
exists for the operator of the nuclear power plant, also referred to as the 
channeling of liability.
247
 This rule is debatable from an economic 
perspective, particularly because channeling excludes holding other parties 
liable who likely contributed to the risk.
248
 
Notably, the U.S. requested the introduction of the principle of 
channeling to the international treaty regime.
249
 Because the U.S. was the 
original manufacturer of nuclear technology and material, U.S. suppliers 
feared they would be held liable for nuclear accidents that occurred at 
facilities they supplied outside the U.S., namely in Europe.
250
 A 
channeling of liability was introduced in international conventions to 
prevent U.S. suppliers from being held liable.
251
 The same reasoning was 
advanced in China to justify the channeling of liability there.
252
 Foreign 
suppliers feared being held liable for delivering nuclear material to 
China.
253
 The 1986 Reply channeled liability to Chinese operators 
excluding the liability of foreign suppliers.
254
 This was analogous to 
 
 
 244. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n). This provision requires the nuclear plant owner to waive certain 
defenses they might otherwise have under local tort law if an accident comprises an ENO. This waiver 
of defenses makes this liability strict. For the discussion of strict liability under the PAA, see Donald 
Jose & Michael Garza, The Price-Anderson Public Liability Action and Strict Liability, BEPRESS 
LEGAL SERIES 6–7 (2007), available at http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/2022/. 
 245. The PAA does not preempt state law. The state law still applies if it is not inconsistent with 
the PAA. See 42 U.S.C. § 2014(h). The PAA only waives certain defenses under the state law when a 
nuclear accident qualifies as an ENO. Id. § 2210(n). Therefore, under other conditions, the State law 
still applies. 
 246. There is some case law that requires the establishment of fault or violation of due care 
standards. See O’Connor v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 13 F.3d 1090 (7th Cir. 1994); In re TMI Gen. 
Pub. Utils. Corp., 67 F.3d 1103 (3d Cir. 1995); Cook v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 273 F. Supp. 2d 1175 
(D. Colo. 2003); In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litigation, 350 F. Supp. 2d 871, 875 (E.D. Wash. 
2004). 
 247. Nobert Pelzer, Learning the Hard Way: Did the Lessons Taught by the Chernobyl Nuclear 
Accident Contributing to Improving Nuclear Law?, in INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR LAW IN THE POST-
CHERNOBYL PERIOD (OECD) 100 (2006); see also supra Part IV.C (defining and discussing the 
principle of channeling of liability). 
 248. See Faure & Fiore, supra note 261, at 230. 
 249. van den Borre, supra note 87, at 262–63. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. at 263–66.  
 252. Cai Xianfeng, supra note 125, at 291. 
 253. Id. 
 254. 1986 STATE COUNCIL REPLY, supra note 12, art. 2. 
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international conventions channeling liability away from U.S. suppliers.
255
 
The system established under the U.S. Price-Anderson Act does not 
channel liability (whereby the liability of other parties who could have 
caused a nuclear accident is excluded), but a so-called economic 
channeling process takes place through the American Nuclear Insurers 
(“ANI”).256 ANI provides a so-called omnibus coverage for all parties 
involved in the nuclear operation, creating its own type of liability 
channeling.
257
  
Critics of the international regime also criticize its financial cap of 
liability.
258
 In pursuance of the conventions, nuclear operators have a cap 
amount to which they can be held civilly liable for a nuclear accident.
259
 
The Paris Convention first fixed the amount in 1960, but it has been 
modified several times.
260
 Before the last modifying protocols of the Paris 
and Brussels Conventions, an operator’s liability limit in a country like 
France was fixed at € 91 million (116 million USD).261 The latest protocol 
from 2004 now caps the amount at € 700 million (893 million USD), but it 
has yet to enter into force.
262
 Critics argue that even € 700 million is likely 
incredibly insufficient to cover all of the victims of a nuclear accident.
263
  
The third source of criticism stems from the provision in the Brussels 
Convention that “provides a complementary mechanism of compensation 
based on public funds.”264 The complementary mechanism applies in cases 
where the liability required from operators is insufficient to cover the costs 
to the victims.
265
 The Brussels Convention adds two risk layers, one layer 
consisting of aid by the national state and another layer consisting of aid 
by all parties to the Convention.
266
 Since the precise amount depends on 
national implementation, the amounts available for compensation differ.
267
 
For example, in France, the total amount available to victims under the 
Paris and Brussels Conventions consisted of € 381 million.268 After the 
 
 
 255. van den Borre, supra note 87, at 262–63. 
 256. Id. at 300. 
 257. Id. at 299–302. 
 258. Id. at 297. 
 259. Paris Convention of 2004, supra note 183, art. 7. 
 260. Paris Convention of 1960, supra note 122, art. 3. 
 261. See Michael G. Faure & Karine Fiore, An Economic Analysis of a Nuclear Liability Subsidy, 
26 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 419, 427 (2009).  
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. at 428. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Faure & Fiore, supra note 261, at 429–30. 
 268. Id. This allocation breaks down to € 91 million based on the operator’s liability cap, € 140 
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modification protocol (when it would enter into force), the total amount of 
coverage available would be € 1.5 billion.269 Critics within the legal 
literature world argue that this level of government intervention would 
provide a generous subsidy to the nuclear operator that caused a 
devastating nuclear accident.
270
  
Since 1975, the U.S. regime does not include government 
compensation through public funds.
271
 The U.S. Price-Anderson Act 
capped the first layer of an operator’s liability at $60 million, which is 
then supplemented by contributions that all operators make via retroactive 
premiums.
272
 Today, the individual liability of a nuclear operator is $375 
million supplemented with a second layer of retrospective premiums of 
$11.86 billion, leading to a total amount of $12.2 billion without any 
government intervention.
273
 Because there is, in principle, no government 
intervention, the U.S. Price-Anderson Act shows less inefficiency in 
comparison to the international regime.
274
 
As indicated above,
275
 the Chinese regime contains many of the same 
inefficiencies as the international regime. Not only is there a relatively low 
financial cap (at least compared to the international regime and certainly to 
the U.S. Price-Anderson Act), but there is also government indemnity.
276
 
Of course, state intervention for compensation in China is perhaps, in 
principle, not that different from operators’ liability. We indicated above 
 
 
million based on the state’s intervention, and € 150 million consisting of the contracting parties’ 
coverage. Id. at 430. 
 269. This consists of € 700 million for the operator’s liability, € 500 million of state’s 
intervention, and € 300 million of all contracting parties. Id.  
 270. See, e.g., Faure & Fiore, supra note 261, at 227–48 (discussing the different options for 
nuclear liability insurance and optimal way to cover the costs operators’ liability limits). 
 271. Faure & Vanden, supra note 242, at 242–43. 
 272. Pub. L. No. 94-197, § 3, 89 Stat. 1111 (1975). 
 273. See Amounts of Financial Protections for Certain Reactors, 10 C.F.R. § 140.11 (1960); see 
also SFP Policy, AM. NUCLEAR INSURERS, available at http://www.amnucins.com/SFP.html (last 
visited May 30, 2012). 
 274. This depends on whether the amount of $12.2 billion would be sufficient to cover the costs of 
an average nuclear incident. See Faure & Borre, supra note 242 (detailing the comparison between the 
international regime and the U.S. Price-Anderson Act). 
 275. See supra Part IV.E. 
 276. 2007 STATE COUNCIL REPLY, supra note 12, art. 7. It states specifically: 
For the operators of nuclear power stations and the operators of spent fuel storage, 
transportation and post-treatment, the maximum amount of compensation for the damages 
caused by one nuclear accident is RMB 300 million; and for other operators the maximum 
amount of compensation for the damages caused by one nuclear accident is RMB 100 
million. Where the total amount of compensation payable for the damages caused by a 
nuclear accident exceeds the relevant maximum amount of compensation specified above, the 
State shall provide a financial indemnity up to RMB 800 million.  
Id.; see also supra Part IV.E. 
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that only three state-owned enterprises are engaged in the operation of 
nuclear power plants in China.
277
 But even those three state-owned 
enterprises are commercial parties that seek to maximize profits. 
Consequently, it may be important to expose the Chinese operators to the 
full social costs of a nuclear accident in order to force them to internalize 
externalities and to correctly price nuclear power, including the true social 
costs. 
Like the international regime and the U.S. Price-Anderson Act, China 
also requires financial security for the amount due from the operator.
278
 
Moreover, analogous to the U.S. and many other legal systems that follow 
the international treaties, insurance companies have joined forces via a 
pooling regime.
279
 In this respect, China’s tendency to compensate for 
nuclear damage via a pool of nuclear power plant operators is 
predominantly in line with international tendencies.
280
 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
China has been a nuclear nation for many years now. Since the start of 
China’s economic development in the early 1980s, the use of nuclear 
energy has shifted from military use to commercial use.
281
 Given China’s 
enormous demand for energy, the Chinese government made plans to 
substantially increase nuclear power production. Between 2005 and 2020, 
China plans to construct fifty-two new power plants.
282
 The construction 
of twenty-nine has already started.
283
 China’s dependence on nuclear 
energy will likely increase in the future given its commitment to reduce 
carbon dioxide emissions.
284
 
 
 
 277. See supra Part II.C. 
 278. 2007 STATE COUNCIL REPLY, supra note 12, art. 8. 
 279. See supra Part IV.F. 
 280. Pooling by nuclear power plant operators, however, is criticized from an economic 
perspective for limiting competition. The European competition authorities, as well as several other 
authorities, critically review nuclear pools. See Michael Faure & Roger van den Bergh, Competition on 
the European Market for Liability Insurance and Efficient Accident Law, 9 MAASTRICHT J. OF EUR. 
AND COMP. L. 279 (2002).  
 281. See supra Part II.A. 
 282. Nuclear Power in China, supra note 44. 
 283. Id.  
 284. The development of nuclear power is even faster than the aim set in its medium- and long-
term development plan for nuclear power. Therefore, the China’s National Energy Administration 
further increased the aim of nuclear development in 2009. See Zhang ZhongXiang, China in the 
Transition to a Low-Carbon Economy, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 6638, 6647 (2010); see also Zhou Sheng & 
Zhang Xiliang, Nuclear Energy Development in China: A Study of Opportunities and Challenges, 35 
ENERGY 4282, 4286 (2010) (discussing opportunities and drivers of nuclear energy development in 
China over the past decade).  
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This increasing use of nuclear energy raises the issue of victim 
compensation in the event of a nuclear accident. How would victims be 
compensated if there were a tragic nuclear accident? At first blush, this 
question may seem primarily of interest to China given the size of China’s 
territory, but the effects of the Chernobyl incident of April 26, 1986 were 
felt worldwide.
285
 Thus, policies related to victim compensation may affect 
both victims living in China and victims living abroad, even if the nuclear 
accident occurred in Chinese territory. 
China has not joined any of the international treaty regimes concerning 
nuclear liability. But that does not necessarily mean that China would only 
provide weak protection for victims of nuclear accidents. After all, the 
international treaty regimes have been seriously criticized, inter alia, for 
imposing financial caps on the liability of operators and providing 
insufficient compensation.
286
 Other large nations such as the U.S. have 
also not joined the international treaties. The U.S. implemented its own 
regime via the Price-Anderson Act.
287
 The nuclear disaster at 
Fukushima
288
 illustrates this point. Japan did not join any of the 
international treaties, but it has an elaborate nuclear liability act with 
unlimited operator liability and significant minimum mandatory 
coverage.
289
 
The problem is, unlike in the U.S. or in Japan, China has no general 
nuclear liability act that would regulate the compensation rights of victims. 
Since 1984, China has been drafting an act that would regulate nuclear 
energy and also deal with its liability issues. Thus far, though, this act has 
not been promulgated.
290
 Consequently, the current legal framework 
regulating compensation for victims of nuclear accidents consists of a 
collection of measures. The general rules of tort law, such as those laid out 
in the GPCL and the new Tort Law of 2009, do apply. But these rules only 
vaguely introduce a strict liability rule without further detailing how courts 
should implement it.
291
 The two replies of the State Council provide these 
details, but their legal statuses are currently debated.
292
  
 
 
 285. For detailed research about the impact of Chernobyl accident, see OECD/NEA, CHERNOBYL: 
ASSESSMENT OF RADIOLOGICAL AND HEALTH IMPACTS (2002), available at http://www.oecd-nea.org/ 
rp/reports/2003/nea3508-chernobyl.pdf. 
 286. See Faure & Borre, supra note 242, at 265–69. 
 287. See supra Part V.  
 288. See supra Part I. 
 289. For a detailed analysis of the compensation system for nuclear damage in Japan and the 
compensation system of the Fukushima incident, see Julius Weitzdörfer, supra note 3.  
 290. See supra Part III.A. 
 291. See supra Part III.A. 
 292. See supra Part III.B. 
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China is predominantly in line with the trends of the international 
treaties as far as content is concerned; a financial cap is imposed upon the 
nuclear power plant operators’ liability,293 but the operators are held 
strictly liable, and liability is channeled to them.
294
 Operators have a duty 
to seek financial coverage, and they do so in practice by seeking insurance 
coverage from a pool of nuclear insurers.
295
 In the event that damage 
exceeds the cap of liability, the government will provide an indemnity.
296
 
The potential liability of nuclear operators in China is small compared to 
the international regime, especially compared to nuclear operators in the 
U.S. under the Price-Anderson Act, but the Chinese government is 
committed to providing additional financial indemnity. Consequently, the 
same criticisms that apply to the international regime also apply to the 
Chinese model, as the financial cap prevents operators from being fully 
exposed to the social costs of their activity. In fact, the cap constitutes a 
subsidy for nuclear energy, and as a result, relative prices of nuclear 
energy will be too low.  
Given the increasing importance of nuclear energy in China, it is highly 
likely that China will implement its plans to introduce one all 
encompassing regulation on nuclear energy, including nuclear liability. In 
that respect, China can learn valuable lessons from an international 
comparison, especially with the U.S. Price-Anderson Act. It might 
encourage operators to internalize the costs of nuclear energy production, 
and would thus be more in line with an economic perspective on nuclear 
liability. 
 
 
 293. See 2007 STATE COUNCIL REPLY, supra note 12, art. 7.  
 294. Id. art. 2. 
 295. See supra Part IV.F. 
 296. See supra Part IV.E. 
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